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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Empagran decision1 concerned a global price-fixing agreement between mostly 
European producers of certain vitamin products, resulting in some $7 billion in overcharge.2 
Once the cartel was discovered, several types of law enforcement took place. One was public 
enforcement: the U.S. Department of Justice, the European Commission, and the antitrust 
agencies of several other countries imposed stiff administrative fines.3 Another was private 
domestic enforcement: a class action by U.S. purchasers ended in a billion dollar settlement; 
separate proceedings in other jurisdictions led to further payments, though at far lower amounts. 
The most interesting proceedings were the actions brought in the Empagran case. Plaintiffs had 
purchased vitamin products in countries other than the United States, many of which do not 
provide the means for proper public or private prosecution against the cartel – Ecuador, Panama, 
the Ukraine.4 They nonetheless brought suit in U.S. federal court and alleged applicability of the 
Sherman Act under their reading of the effects doctrine as formulated in the Foreign Trade 
Antitrust Improvement Act5: the price fixing had an effect on the U.S. market, even though these 
particular plaintiffs had not suffered their particular injuries as participants in the U.S. market. 
Justice Breyer held, for a unanimous court, that the plaintiffs’ claim was not covered.  
Empagran is often discussed as a decision representing a transnationalist approach to 
statutory interpretation in accordance with the demands of globalization; Justice Breyer himself 
has referred to it in this sense in lectures.6 This is, however, only one possible reading, and 
perhaps only the most superficial one. A second reading, focusing less on the rhetoric and more 
on the actual application, shows the decision in Empagran to be isolationist. Despite the talk of 
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1 F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004). I co-authored an amicus curiae brief in the 
case, but the remarks here are independent from the argument made there. 
2 For details on the vitamins cartel, see John M. Connor, Global Price Fixing (2007). 
3 Not all agencies were similarly harsh. The Swiss agency issued a mere injunction to cease future price-fixing – at 
the time the harshest instrument available against a first-time perpetrator. 
4 One named plaintiff came from Australia, which does have effective enforcement. He withdrew in light of the 
possibility to sue in Australia. See Bray v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. (2002) 118 FCR 1; aff’d (2003) 130 FCR 317 
(Australia). The class was not confined to plaintiffs from countries lacking effective antitrust enforcement. 
5 15 U.S.C. § 6a). 
6 See infra notes 12, 25, 34. 
globalization, the reading reveals the decision to represent a return to a stark territorialism. A 
third reading, finally, focusing on what is left unsaid in the opinion, reveals a hegemonialist 
opinion, in which the interests of the developed world are brought into congruence, while those 
of the developing world remain outside the analysis altogether. These three readings define the 
structure of this paper. 
These different readings are not specific to international antitrust, nor to the role of the 
Court in the twenty-first century. This becomes clear when the rhetoric in Empagran is 
juxtaposed with arguments made two hundred years earlier in cases involving the extraterritorial 
application of British and American laws prohibiting the slave trade. Although the slave trade 
problem is very different from the problem of global cartels, some structural similarities may 
explain why we find surprisingly similar arguments. Slavery, slave trade and piracy represented 
the big global challenge to the nation state of the nineteenth century, not unlike the way in which 
the global economy challenges the system of states in the twenty-first century. In both situations, 
private actors engage in the enforcement of presumably global norms: prize seekers in the 
nineteenth century, private plaintiffs in the twenty-first. Sometimes the law rewards these private 
actors – as privateers on the oceans, as private attorney generals in international antitrust. 
Sometimes it despises them – as pirates, or as greedy plaintiffs (or plaintiffs’ lawyers). These 
structural similarities do not make these cases, or the situations they address, similar in 
substance. Yet, their structural similarity invites courts to make strikingly similar arguments in 
their attempts to balance the national with the international, and the public interests with the 
private. This similarity can therefore provide an important element in answering the question 
whether international law has changed. 
II. A TRANSNATIONALIST READING: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Here is how Justice Breyer justifies limiting the scope of U.S. antitrust law in Empagran: 
this Court ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable 
interference with the sovereign authority of other nations. This rule of construction 
reflects principles of customary international law—law that (we must assume) 
Congress ordinarily seeks to follow. This rule of statutory construction cautions 
courts to assume that legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of 
other nations when they write American laws. It thereby helps the potentially 
conflicting laws of different nations work together in harmony—a harmony 
particularly needed in today's highly interdependent commercial world.7 
This quote is Justice Breyer’s restatement of the Charming Betsy presumption against statutory 
interpretations in violation of international law. That presumption, formulated in the nineteenth 
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century8 is thus applied, apparently without great difficulty, to the twenty-first century situation 
of global interdependence.9 In this so-perceived modern world, transnational law has become a 
hybrid that transcends boundaries – between public and private law,10 between international and 
comparative law,11 and even between foreign and domestic law. In Justice Breyer’s words, “we 
live in a world where today the law of everywhere is becoming everywhere…. It’s spreading 
around, this law… to the point where it becomes harder and harder to say, ‘well, that’s there and 
this is here.’”12 This goes beyond mere interdependence of different territorial states. Instead, we 
find a blurring of all boundaries, a transcendence of territorial states altogether, and the 
replacement of separate legal systems with one space of legal argument.13 Territorial boundaries 
no longer matter (a frequent theme in globalization debates), but that is no problem, because 
good judicial craftsmanship can help bring about global harmony. 
Yet another boundary is broken down for the sake of international harmony, that between 
international law and international relations. Gerald Neuman’s suggestion that “in Empagran, … 
Justice Breyer subtly gave the Government more law than it wanted, by invoking the Charming 
Betsy canon,”14 may not be exact. The Charming Betsy presumption has traditionally been a 
legal doctrine of statutory interpretation, formulated to resolve actual conflicts with international 
law. “Work together in harmony,” by contrast is a doctrine of international relations, formulated 
to avoid potential conflicts with foreign sovereigns. Rather than insert the Charming Betsy 
doctrine into foreign relations (as Neuman suggests), the Court inserts international relations into 
the Charming Betsy doctrine. In Empagran, the Court establishes itself as an organ of 
international relations, and international law is merely an element in the assessment of the best 
approach. 
Of course, the federal courts have played a role in foreign relations since the founding of 
the republic, as David Sloss has demonstrated,15 and foreign relations have always been a 
consideration for the Charming Betsy presumption. In the early days of the Republic, the 
deference to foreign law in statutory interpretation was often based on a desire to avoid conflict 
with stronger countries.16 This could imply that the Charming Betsy presumption was historically 
                                                            
8 Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804); chapter 1, notes xx – xx and accompanying text. 
9 Classical texts are Joseph Nye & Robert Keohane, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition 
(1977); Richard N. Cooper, Economic Policy in an Interdependent World (1985). 
10 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 Nebr. L. Rev. 181, 184 (1994); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A 
Global Community of Courts, 44 Harv. Int’l L. Rev. 191, 192 (2003). 
11 Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 265, 267 (“my description blurs the differences 
between what my law professors used to call comparative law and public international law”). 
12 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer: A Presentation on International Law, April 10, 2009, available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o5zaImTF92g. The quoted passage begins at 16:40. 
13 Michael Zürn, From Interdependence to Globalization, in Handbook of International Relations 235 (Walter 
Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen, Beth A. Simmons eds. 2002). 
14 Gerald L. Neuman, The Abiding Significance of Law in Foreign Relations, 2004 Sup. Ct. Rev. 111, 124. 
15 David Sloss, Judicial Foreign Policy: Lessons from the 1790s, 53 St. Louis Univ. L. J. 145 (2008). 
16 See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 11 (1801); John Fiske, The critical Period of American History, 1783-1789, pp. 
127-28 (1888); Frederick C. Leiner, The Charming Betsy and the Marshall Court, 45 Am. J. Leg. Hist. 1, 18 (2001). 
tied to the status of the United States as a weak nation,17 and as a consequence, it could have 
become dispensable once the United States became the world’s only superpower.18 But the weak 
nation reasoning cannot explain everything. Not only has the doctrine survived the rise of the 
United States in decisions after World War II.19 More importantly, Charming Betsy was not an 
isolated U.S. decision: around the same time, British courts announced a similar doctrine for the 
British Empire, then the world’s biggest power. In Le Louis, Sir William Scott (later Lord 
Stowell) held that the new British antislavery act abolished slavery but did not allow seizure of 
foreign ships involved in slave trade.20 The legal basis was a canon of interpretation similar to 
the Charming Betsy: “neither this British Act of Parliament, nor any commission founded on it, 
can affect any right or interest of foreigners, unless they are founded upon principles and impose 
regulations that are consistent with the law of nations. That is the only law which Great Britain 
can apply to them; and the generality of any terms employed in an Act of Parliament must be 
narrowed in construction by a religious adherence thereto.”21  
This suggests that the Charming Betsy presumption traditionally represented, at least 
primarily, not a pure policy assessment but an intrinsically legal doctrine. Even if its application 
was meant to avoid international discord, the only relevant discord was that created by violations 
of the law of nations.22 In Empagran, by contrast, the Court speaks not of compatibility with 
international law, but instead of compatibility with foreign “sovereign authority” and “legitimate 
sovereign interests.”23 It thereby turns the legal doctrine into a policy. Scholars have interpreted 
the Charming Betsy presumption as an implied deference of international relations matters to the 
Executive.24 The Court in Empagran apparently accepts the view of international law as 
international relations, but draws a different conclusion: if international law is international 
governance, then the courts themselves, first and foremost the U.S. Supreme Court, must adopt 
the role of global governor.25 In a world in which diplomatic protests addressed to the executive 
                                                            
17 Cf. e.g., Curtis Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role 
of International Law, 86 Geo. L. J. 479, 492 (1998).  
18 Id., at 519. 
19 See Chapter 12, notes xx – xx and accompanying text. 
20 Le Louis (1817) 165 E.R. 1464, 1474 (2 Dodson’s Admiralty Repts. 210, 239). For historical context, see Tara 
Helfman, Note: The Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone and the Abolition of the West African Slave Trade, 115 
Yale L.J. 1122 (2006).  
21 Le Louis, 165 E.R. at 1474 (2 Dodson’s Admiralty Repts. at 239); see also Leroux v. Brown (1852) 22 L.J.C.P. 1, 
3 per Maule, J. (“If the meaning of the Act is doubtful, it is a reason for not putting a particular interpretation upon 
it, that that interpretation would violate the comity of nations.”)  
22 See Chapter 12, notes xx – xx and accompanying text. 
23 Compare Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455 (2007). 
24 Bradley, supra note xx. 
25 Stephen Breyer, International Governance and American Law, speech at the Brookings Institution, 24 June, 2008, 
available at http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/0624_international_law.aspx. Cf. Ralf Michaels, US-Gerichte 
als Weltgerichte: Die Avantgarde der Globalisierung, 31 DAJV-Newsletter 46-54 (2006); Christopher Whytock, 
Domestic Courts and Global Governance, 84 Tul. L. Rev 67, 74-96 (2010). 
are being supplemented by amicus briefs addressed to the Court—in the Empagran case, seven 
foreign governments submitted such briefs—26 this seems a logical step. 
This rise of international relations as basis of the Charming Betsy presumption coincides 
with the decline of international law. Dutifully, Justice Breyer cites § 403 of the Restatement on 
Foreign Relations, but a real analysis of whether the assertion of jurisdiction would violate § 
403, or international law more generally, is absent. More strikingly, there is also no detailed 
analysis of “potentially conflicting laws.”27 If Justice Breyer’s thoughts on the globalization of 
law were apt, one might expect the potential for such conflicts to be low. Elsewhere, he has 
claimed that “[t]he commercial law of the various states, for example, has become close to a 
single, unified body of law.“28 Indeed, price-fixing is banned in nearly every legal system in the 
world (a point emphasized in Empagran, ironically, by the defendants). Plaintiffs’ lawyers had 
even claimed that the ban on price-fixing amounted to a principle of customary international law, 
a suggestion the lower court rejected.29 Moreover, the effects doctrine for establishing 
jurisdiction in antitrust matters, whose contours were still in dispute worldwide when the U.S. 
Supreme Court previously addressed the application of the Sherman Act against British 
reinsurers in Hartford Fire,30 has since become universally accepted, albeit with variants. 
However, Justice Breyer does not consider such agreement on ends to be sufficient to 
assume similarity: “[E]ven where nations agree about primary conduct, say, price fixing, they 
disagree dramatically about appropriate remedies.”31 Interestingly, Sir William Scott argued 
similarly about the slave trade in Le Louis: “Nor is it to be argued, that because other nations 
approve the ultimate purpose, they must therefore submit to every measure which any one state 
or its subjects may inconsiderately adopt for its attainment.”32 In Empagran, this speculation 
might have suggested an actual comparative law analysis. For example, the Court might have 
considered distinguishing between plaintiffs from states that have a functioning antitrust 
regulation scheme (and had said so in their amicus curiae briefs) and those from states without 
such a scheme. Indeed, in other contexts, Justice Breyer has famously suggested how fruitful it is 
to look at other nations’ laws, even where this is not mandated.33 When he speaks about the 
                                                            
26 Briefs were submitted by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium (jointly); Canada; 
Japan; Great Britain, Ireland and the Netherlands (jointly); and the United States. All favored dismissal. 
27 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164.  
28 Breyer, supra note xx, at 267. Cf. Chris Noonan, The Emerging Principles of International Competition Law 
(2007). 
29 Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., 2001 WL 761360, at 8-9 (citing In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust 
Litigation, 127 F.Supp.2d 702, at 717, and Kruman v. Christie's Intern. PLC, 129 F.Supp.2d 620, at 627). See also 
Ioannis Lianos, The Contribution of the United Nations to the Emergence of Global Antitrust Law, 15 Tul. J. Int'l & 
Comp. L. 415 (2007) (arguing that the UNCTAD Set of Principles and Rules on Competition might evolve into 
customary international law). 
30 Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
31 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 167. 
32 Le Louis, 165 E.R. at 1480 (257). 
33 See, e.g., The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between 
Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 I·CON 519 (2005). 
Empagran opinion in presentations, he likes to point out that the Court, in order to decide, “had 
to know something about the antitrust law of the European Union.”34 The Empagran decision 
itself displays little such analysis. The Court considered a detailed comparative law analysis “too 
complex to prove workable”: 
Courts would have to examine how foreign law, compared with American law, 
treats not only price fixing but also, say, information-sharing agreements, patent-
licensing price conditions, territorial product resale limitations, and various forms 
of joint venture, in respect to both primary conduct and remedy. The legally and 
economically technical nature of that enterprise means lengthier proceedings, 
appeals, and more proceedings--to the point where procedural costs and delays 
could themselves threaten interference with a foreign nation's ability to maintain the 
integrity of its own antitrust enforcement system.35 
The image remains of a Court that is not only aware of its role in an interdependent 
world, but also willing and equipped with the tools necessary to fulfill that role, even if it 
ultimately prefers caution over action. The tools are mainly those of international relations, not 
international law. Deference to international law gives way to deference to foreign sovereigns; 
detailed analysis of the exact requirements of international law gives way to an analysis of the 
likelihood of international conflict. Forty years earlier, the Sabbatino Court was criticized for 
adopting its own “strong sense … that its engagement [in foreign relations] may hinder, rather 
than further, this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a 
whole in the international sphere.”36 No similar reaction to Empagran has occurred. 
III. AN ISOLATIONIST READING: 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN A POST-TERRITORIAL WORLD 
What are the consequences of this transnationalist, post-territorial, “work together in 
harmomy” jurisprudence for Empagran? The answer is, to put it mildly, surprising: 
No one denies that America's antitrust laws, when applied to foreign conduct, can 
interfere with a foreign nation's ability independently to regulate its own 
commercial affairs. … But why is it reasonable to apply those laws to foreign 
conduct insofar as that conduct causes independent foreign harm and that foreign 
harm alone gives rise to the plaintiff's claim?37 
This is quite a striking move. Justice Breyer starts with the recognition that both regulated events 
and regulatory instruments transcend territorial boundaries: we are interdependent because 
                                                            
34 Stephen Breyer, After-Dinner Remarks, 41 Int'l Law. 1007, 1009 (2007); Breyer, supra note xx, at 14. 
35 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 168-69. For a similar argument, see Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line, 545 U.S. 119, 154 
n.4 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
36 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964). I thank William S. Dodge for pointing out the 
relevance of Sabbatino in this context. 
37 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165. 
actions in and by one state have impacts on other states. He ends with the conclusion that we 
must confine application of our laws to strictly territorial boundaries. Because the world has 
become deterritorialized, we must apply our laws in a strictly territorial fashion. Because the 
world has become interdependent, we must allow for independent regulation by different 
regulators. In order to “work together in harmony,” each nation must act in isolation for itself: 
the U.S. regulates the U.S. market; Japan regulates the Japanese market, and so on. And the real 
trigger lies not in the valid sovereignty interests of foreign nations, but in the lack of sovereign 
interests of the United States. Suddenly, we have moved away from the twenty-first century 
world of interdependence and cooperation into the nineteenth-century U.S. role of isolationism 
and the desire to keep exclusive territorial competences strictly separate. 
It follows as a matter of course that, in such a world, extraterritorial application of U.S. 
law is unavailable. All that we can hope for is persuasion: 
Where foreign anticompetitive conduct plays a significant role and where foreign 
injury is independent of domestic effects, Congress might have hoped that 
America's antitrust laws, so fundamental a component of our own economic system, 
would commend themselves to other nations as well. But, if America's antitrust 
policies could not win their own way in the international marketplace for such 
ideas, Congress, we must assume, would not have tried to impose them, in an act of 
legal imperialism, through legislative fiat.38 
Justice Marshall expressed a similar idea in The Antelope when he suggested that “[t]he parties 
to the modern law of nations do not propagate their principles by force.”39 Still, it is not clear 
what exactly Justice Breyer has in mind. America’s antitrust policies have, in fact, won much of 
their own way in the international marketplace for ideas40 – including the idea of private 
enforcement, which is being actively discussed in the European Union, and including leniency 
for whistleblowers. If anything, the difference is not in the substantive antitrust laws but in the 
procedure for their enforcement, but procedure has traditionally been a matter for lex fori. 
How did we get from a “highly interdependent commercial world” to “independent 
foreign harm” and “a foreign nation’s ability independently to regulate its own commercial 
affairs”? By way of an assumption so crucial that Justice Breyer numerous times. Here is the 
most elaborate formulation of the fiction: “We reemphasize that we base our decision upon the 
following: the price-fixing conduct significantly and adversely affects both customers outside the 
United States and customers within the United States, but the adverse foreign effect is 
independent of any adverse domestic effect.”41 This assumption is a fiction. In a “highly 
interdependent commercial world,” effects on one nation’s markets are never independent from 
                                                            
38 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 169. 
39 The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 121 (1825); see Chapter 1, notes __-__ and accompanying text.  
40 See Joel Davidow, The Worldwide Influence of U.S. Antitrust, 35 Antitrust Bull. 603 (1990). 
41 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164. 
effects on another nation’s markets.42 The vitamins cartel, in order to avoid arbitrage, had to keep 
prices roughly the same in all geographically close markets. Justice Breyer knows this, but he 
faces a challenge: the globalization he invokes comes back to haunt him. The doctrines which the 
Court has at its disposal were made for a nineteenth-century world defined by territorial states. 
These doctrines do not fit globalization and the transcendence of territorial borders. Perhaps new 
doctrines are needed; perhaps the old doctrine must be deterritorialized.43 The Court, however, 
finds another way. Instead of deterritorializing existing rules, it reterritorializes the phenomena to 
which these rules are applied. Rather than adapt the doctrines to globalization, it adapts 
globalization to the doctrines. If the nineteenth-century rules do not fit the twenty-first-century 
world, too bad for the latter – the Court turns it, by fiction, into a nineteenth-century world.  
This result, of course, does not require all the globalization talk, as Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence makes clear 
I concur in the judgment of the Court because the language of the statute is readily 
susceptible of the interpretation the Court provides and because only that 
interpretation is consistent with the principle that statutes should be read in accord 
with the customary deference to the application of foreign countries' laws within 
their own territories.44 
This concurrence links the decision to another venerated canon of international law, the 
presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes, as formulated by Justice Story in The 
Apollon.45 That presumption, however, has become problematic, because territoriality has 
changed both its social and legal meaning. In 1825, jurisdiction was thought to be largely 
confined to national territory. Consequently, the presumption against extraterritoriality was 
almost equivalent to a presumption against violations of international law. Roger Alford neatly 
explains how this idea withered away in U.S. law in the twentieth century.46Today, international 
law no longer poses such extensive restrictions on domestic jurisdiction over foreign conduct. 
The presumption against extraterritoriality has survived this shift, but it has lost its grounding in 
international law.47 
Moreover, this decline of territoriality as a limit in international law has gone hand-in-
hand with the declining importance of territoriality in society. Modern transportation has made 
                                                            
42 This is not a new insight. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) 
(“Almost any limitation of the supply of goods in Europe, for example, or in South America, may have 
repercussions in the United States if there is trade between the two.”); see also Chapter 8, notes xx – xx and 
accompanying text. 
43 Ralf Michaels, Territorial Jurisdiction after Territoriality, in Globalisation and Jurisdiction 105 (Pieter J. Slot & 
Mielle Bulterman eds., 2004). 
44 Empagran , 542 U.S. at 176 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
45 The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 370 (1824); see chapter 1, notes xx – xx and accompanying text. 
46 Chapter 8, notes xx – xx and accompanying text. 
47 William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 85, 114 
(1998). 
crossing boundaries much easier; new modes of communication make territorial boundaries 
meaningless for many important endeavors; globalized markets pay little respect to national 
boundaries. The conduct of important actors, which is the object of most statutory regulation, is 
trans-territorial. A canon of interpretation that insists on territoriality stands in odd contrast to 
these developments. 
Prior to the shift, Congress was presumed not to legislate beyond territorial boundaries 
because that would be unusual and would violate international law. Now that the canon has lost 
its legal foundation in international law and its teleological foundation in a presumed 
predominantly local character of regulated behavior, it is unclear what justifies it. One 
suggestion is that courts should avoid extraterritorial application to avoid subjecting the United 
States to foreign criticism without participation by the political branches,48 but this does not 
explain why limits of scope should be those of territorial boundaries. Another justification is “the 
commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.”49 This 
justification is weak where, as in Empagran, the statute at hand is one aimed at determining the 
scope of extraterritorial application (though the justification has been used in such contexts, 
too.)50 More importantly, the justification begs the very question of what exactly are “domestic 
concerns.”51 In choice of law, such insights have led in the twentieth century to the development 
of interest analysis, whereby courts determine the scope of application on the basis of 
governmental interest and then resolve resulting conflicts with the regulatory interests of other 
states. If the presumption against extraterritoriality was once a presumption against the violation 
of choice-of-law rules, as has been argued,52 one might expect it to change along with choice-of-
law rules, as many authors have suggested it should.53 Empagran suggests the powerful grip that 
ideas of territoriality still hold even over a Justice who claims to be above it. 
Territorial limits to jurisdiction present normative problems when applied to phenomena 
that do not respect territorial boundaries. If the effects of certain conduct transcend boundaries, 
while congressional statutes are presumed to remain within territorial boundaries, then the effects 
outside the borders remain unregulated. This has led some to conclude that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, revived under the Rehnquist Court,54 is merely a fig leaf for judicial 
                                                            
48 See e.g. Curtis Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 Va. J. Int’l L. 505 
(1997). 
49 E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 338 U.S. 281, 
285 (1949)); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993) (cited approvingly by Justice Breyer in Small v. 
United States, 544 U.S. 386, 388-89 (2005)). 
50 Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455-56 (2007). 
51 Dodge, supra n. 47 at 119 (suggesting that “domestic concerns” are “effects within the United States”); Andrew 
Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 Geo. L.J. 883 (2002). 
52 Note: Preserving the Inviolability of Rules of Conflict of Laws by Statutory Construction, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 319 
(1938). 
53 See, e.g., William S. Dodge, The Public-Private Distinction in the Conflict of Laws, 18 Duke J. Int’l. Comp. L. 
371 (2008) (with further references at 372 n. 8). 
54 John H. Knox, Legislative Jurisdiction, Judicial Canons, and International Law, ___ Am. J. Int’l L. ____. 
dislike of congressional regulation.55 Justice Holmes’ decision in American Banana has been 
explained by his aversion to the Sherman Act.”56 Justice Breyer, after deciding Empagran, has 
been praised as “the go-to guy for American business in regulatory and economic cases.”57 
Such crude realist speculations on the Justices’ real intentions must remain somewhat 
speculative even for individual decisions; for the law at large, they have limited explanatory 
value. In Empagran, especially, the suggestion that the real goal is underregulation may not fully 
hold. The Court emphasizes that other countries have antitrust laws, too. Presumably, therefore, 
regulation of the cartel would not stop at U.S. borders. Instead, other nations would regulate, 
even if they did so by different means. This suggests that today the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is not merely a policy decision in favor of multinational corporations. The 
Court refuses to concentrate all claims concerning the global cartel in one nation’s courts,58 but it 
does not reject the idea that all these claims should be heard somewhere. Instead, the 
presumption against extraterritoriality establishes a checkerboard map of regulatory authorities, 
in which each country is responsible for regulating its own territory. This checkerboard map 
resembles that of the nineteenth century, but the resemblance is superficial. Then, it represented 
the reality of most social relations and of international law. Today, territorial borders are an 
arbitrary and formalist device in a globalized world, but one that helps to avoid overlapping 
regulatory claims precisely because of its formal character.59 The nineteenth-century 
checkerboard view of the world survives in the twenty-first century, but it changes its character: 
it has become a formal-technical device for the allocation of regulatory authority. 
IV. A HEGEMONIALIST READING: 
THE ABSENCE OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
A problem remains. The idea of decentralized regulation – each regulates its own 
markets, so all the world is regulated – can succeed only if regulatory authority exists 
everywhere on the checkerboard. This is a problem in antitrust law. Although the United States 
is no longer the only country with effective antitrust enforcement, many countries still lack the 
capacity or political will (or both) to crack down on cartels. None of these considerations, 
however, can be found in the Empagran decision. The most striking passage in the opinion is one 
in which Justice Breyer suggests such a checkerboard world of regulation: “Why should 
American law supplant, for example, Canada's or Great Britain's or Japan's own determination 
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about how best to protect Canadian or British or Japanese customers from anticompetitive 
conduct…?”60 
This is a strange way of putting the problem. In Empagran, the named plaintiffs were not 
“Canadian, or British or Japanese customers”– they came from Ukraine, Ecuador, and Panama. 
Yet throughout the opinion, Justice Breyer never addresses the sovereign interests of those 
countries. When he states that application of U.S. law “would undermine foreign nations' own 
antitrust enforcement policies,”61 he is not speaking of Ecuador (which may be quite happy if the 
United States cracks down on cartels impacting that country).62 Instead, he speaks of Germany 
and Canada. When he fears that “to apply our remedies would unjustifiably permit [foreign 
nations’] citizens to bypass their own less generous remedial schemes, thereby upsetting a 
balance of competing considerations that their own domestic antitrust laws embody,”63 the 
balance of competing considerations he has in mind is that of Germany, Canada, and Japan, not 
that of Ukraine. In the end, Justice Breyer is not allowing Canada, Great Britain, or Japan to 
determine how best to protect their consumers as he proclaims. Instead, he is protecting 
Canadian, British, and Japanese corporations against their overcharged customers abroad.64 All 
named plaintiffs come from developing countries; all defendants and all amicus briefs come 
from developed countries. The court will apparently listen to the latter, and ignore the former. 
In doing so, the Court adopts not only the nineteenth century idea of neatly distinguished 
territorial entities; it also adopts the old idea of an international law limited to European and 
North American countries.65 Developed countries regulate their markets, and the rest of the 
world remains unregulated – with the consequence that European and American defendants can 
retrieve the money they lose to American and European plaintiffs and regulators. Justice 
Breyer’s harmony among countries creates quite an exclusive club. In the name of avoiding U.S. 
hegemony over other developed countries, the Supreme Court endorses hegemony of developed 
over undeveloped countries. It avoids the imperialism of imposing U.S. law on others, but it 
endorses the imperialism of restricting access to U.S. law. 
The exclusive focus on the sovereign interests of Western countries is best demonstrated, 
ironically, by the near absence of non-Western countries in Western discourse, especially in the 
United States. But it has a long and well-known history in international law. An uneasy relation 
to developing countries characterized the Court’s first major opinion on international antitrust, 
                                                            
60 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165. 
61 Id. at 168. 
62See the discussion in Michal Gal, Antitrust in a Globalized Economy: The Unique Enforcement Challenges Faced 
by Small and Developing Jurisdiction, 33 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1, 40-45 (2009). 
63 542 U.S. at 167. 
64 See, e.g., Brief of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium as Amici Curiae at 2; Brief 
of the Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae, p. 1. All foreign governments and the U.S. government supported the 
defendants. 
65 See Chapter 2, notes xx – xx and accompanying text. 
American Banana.66 There, Justice Holmes suggested that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality might not apply to “regions subject … to no law that civilized countries would 
recognize as adequate,”67 but he did not ultimately apply this exception to Costa Rica, which for 
the time has aptly been characterized as a “Banana Republic”.68 One explanation can perhaps be 
found in a citation to a passage in Dicey’s work on conflict of laws dealing with “law governing 
acts done in uncivilized countries.”69 Dicey realized that deference to uncivilized countries could 
hardly be justified by principles of civility. Nonetheless, he suggested applying the rules 
governing relations with civilized countries by analogy, as far as possible.70 In other words, the 
inclusion of non-Western nations in the family of nations does not alter the concept of a state in 
international law. Instead, that concept, crafted after Western models, is imposed on non-
Western countries by analogy. 
We can see even more striking similarities in the treatment of Africa in the slave trade 
cases. In Le Louis, Sir Walter Scott was aware that deference to the interests of France operates 
to the detriment of Africa – “peace in Europe will be war in Africa.”71 In the end, however, 
relations with France were more important than those with Africa. Scott asked: “Why is the 
British judge to intrude himself in subsidium juris, when everything requisite will be performed 
in the French Court in a legal and effectual manner?”72 . The ensuing move from natural law to 
positivism foreshadowed the U.S. Supreme Court’s similar move, beginning with Marshall’s 
opinion in The Antelope.73 Less often discussed is how the move leads to a reduction in 
international law’s reach: if only the interests and positions of states count, then states that are 
unable to have their positions heard will be ignored. 
Justice Breyer does not play out the developing against the developed world in the same 
way. Rather, he seems to imply that all countries share the same sovereign interest in self-
determination, which must be respected, even if most developing countries lack the means to 
crack down on big international cartels. This equation among sovereigns is reminiscent of Chief 
Justice Marshall’s argument why a universally shared law of nations against slavery does not 
exist: “The parties to the modern law of nations do not propagate their principles by force; and 
Africa has not yet adopted them. Throughout the whole extent of that immense continent, so far 
as we know its history, it is still the law of nations that prisoners are slaves.”74 Of course, this 
                                                            
66 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); see chapter 8, notes xx – xx and accompanying 
text. 
67 213 U.S. at 355. 
68 Chapter 8, text accompanying note xx.. 
69 Albert Venn Dicey, A digest of the law of England with reference to the conflict of laws 724 (2d ed. 1908). 
70 Id. at 726. 
71 Le Louis (1817), 165 E.R. at 1479 (254) 
72 Id. at 1479 (256). 
73 See Chapter 1, notes xx – xx and accompanying text (discussing The Antelope). 
74 The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 121 (1825). For virulent criticism, see Guyora Binder, The Slavery of Emancipation, 17 
Cardozo L. Rev. 2063 (1996). 
curious “gesture towards including Africa within the law of nations”75 was of little use to Africa, 
or at least to its inhabitants subject to the slave trade. Moreover, Marshall confined the judge’s 
standard of international law to “the general assent of that portion of the world of which he 
considers himself as a part”76 – in other words, the Western world, which has long supported the 
slave trade. In such a world, which treats slavery as either a sovereign choice by sovereign 
African states, or as a given fact of African customs that Western nations are free to accept or 
reject, a genuine African interest in the abolition of slavery is absent from any analysis. 
This suggests that the role of sovereignty for developing countries may be more complex 
than is often argued. Traditionally, the extraterritorial application of developed countries’ laws is 
criticized for stripping developing countries of their own regulatory independence,77 with U.S. 
courts “as agents of U.S. hegemony.”78 The underlying assumption is that developing countries’ 
sovereignty is merely formal: they lack the economic and political power to be truly 
independent. Even if this assumption is correct, the conclusion does not necessarily follow. 
Cases from The Antelope through Empagran suggest that the refusal to apply law 
extraterritorially -- especially regarding conduct that is almost universally condemned (slavery, 
price-fixing) – can also be a problem, because it leaves third world countries unprotected against 
the power of transnational commercial actors. If developing countries lack the domestic means to 
regulate those actors themselves, they may depend on developed countries’ willingness to 
regulate their own actors. 
The Court’s real choice in Empagran is not between imperialism and international 
harmony. Rather, the choice is between two kinds of imperialism: one that comes from imposing 
U.S. law on the rest of the world, and the other from rejecting access to the courts necessary for 
protection against Western corporate actors. The Court avoids one kind of imperialism, but 
Justice Breyer’s pride seems unwarranted, because the Court falls, perhaps unavoidably, for 
another kind. 
The omnipresence of some kind of imperialism suggests that a proper analysis of the 
decision might be framed in terms of empire – not in the sense of the United States as an empire, 
but in the sense of a transnational super-state that transcends individual states and imposes a 
collective logic on all of them.79 Susan Marks has translated this dystopia into international 
law;80 her text suggests eerie parallels with Empagran. When she speaks of “a new, global form 
of sovereignty composed of agencies which operate in diverse arenas (national, regional, and 
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global), yet interlock to form a single framework of governance for the entire world,” a “regime 
that knows no territorial boundaries,” that is “dedicated to the inauguration of perpetual peace 
(even if … it remains enmeshed with the deployment and rationalization of violence),”81 she 
paints a picture that looks very much like Justice Breyer’s. However, instead of praising 
international harmony, she highlights the totalitarian and violent character of such a regime: 
“today hierarchies are constituted and sustained by more complex patterns and logics, which are 
obscured, and hence reinforced, where globalization is elided with neo-imperialism.”82 When she 
goes on to find that “with deterritorialization comes reterritorialization,”83 she could have the 
isolationist reading of Empagran in mind. When she finally cites Hardt and Negri for the idea 
that “the geographical and racial lines of oppression and exploitation that were established 
during the era of colonialism and imperialism have in many respects not declined but instead 
increased exponentially,"84 the link to slavery is made. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We should not exaggerate. Marks’ neo-marxist analysis is no less hyperbolical than 
Justice Breyer’s neoliberal celebration of nations working in harmony. The important insight is 
that both analyses are available simultaneously. 
In the end, Empagran is transnationalist in rhetoric, isolationist in application, and 
hegemonial in its effect. A decision with a seemingly straightforward argument is found riddled 
in the conflict between these different logics. A decision with few references to international law 
displays deep links to some of the most pressing international law issues. A decision with 
forward-looking globalization rhetoric is mired in history. A decision praising harmony displays 
somber parallels to decisions refusing interference with the evil of slave trade. This has 
implications for our understanding of international law today, and of its history. 
So, does international law in the Supreme Court manifest qualities of continuity or 
change? The easy answer, of course, is that it displays both change and continuity. The use of the 
Charming Betsy canon suggests continuity; its transformation from a legal doctrine to an 
instrument of foreign politics suggests change. The recognition of globalization and an 
interdependent world suggests change; the effective return to strict territoriality represents 
continuity, or even regress. The presumption against extraterritoriality is a remnant from times 
past; its function as a formal-technical device to allocate regulatory power has changed. 
But the real answer is more complex. The question of continuity or change presumes a 
linear development that is hard to discern in Empagran. The three different readings of the 
opinion – transnationalist, isolationist, and hegemonialist – have a particular relevance for 
historical analysis. If all readings of the decision are possible, perhaps the opinion is rooted in 
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various times. This means, in turn, that Empagran does not represent the end point of some 
linear development, or some sequence of different periods that neatly follow one another. Rather, 
these different logics can all coexist within one opinion, sometimes one paragraph or even one 
sentence. If Empagran is emblematic of the new period of globalization, then it demonstrates 
that globalization is not a time period separate from others. Rather, it is characterized by what 
Ernst Bloch has called Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen, the simultaneity of the non-
simultaneous.85 
Marks’ description of empire as a regime that has overcome not only territorial but also 
temporal boundaries reflects this aspect. Empire has long been a topic of American history. 
Washington’s concept of the United States as an “infant empire” and Jefferson’s dream of an 
“empire of liberty” attest to a celebration of empire from the nation’s founding.86 Discussion 
whether today’s United States is an empire has reappeared, with some celebrating, some 
criticizing the perceived role of the United States as a modern empire that does not require 
territorial acquisitions to rule the world.87 The history of international law in the U.S. Supreme 
Court is also the history of empire, and the current Court cannot escape that history. 
In the end, the absence of such analyses -- both in Empagran and in its scholarly reception -- is 
itself relevant. Scholars view the decision as a move towards comity and transnationalism, like 
they view the slave trade cases as the move from a natural law conception of international law to 
a positivist understanding, and this technical character of international law discourse makes it 
possible to draw connections between the cases. The field, with its core elements such as 
sovereign interests and territoriality, has a formal-conceptual quality that makes it applicable 
over different time periods and vastly different issues. That propensity for abstraction, in the face 
of fundamental changes in world history, can sometimes represent a shocking absence of concern 
for real life problems. Sometimes, by contrast, this propensity is how international law remains 
able, in the face of such changes, to serve as “gentle civilizer,” as Martti Koskenniemi has 
pointed out.88 Empagran, with its reaches back into history, both visible and invisible, represents 
both. 
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